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Abstract
Consider a large number of small individuals contributing to a charity or to a
public good. We study the properties of a competitive equilibrium in giving and allow
for multiple equilibria. Our proposed condition, aggregate strategic complementarity,
is a necessary condition for multiple equilibria. Consider two equilibria with low (L)
and high (H) levels of giving. Comparative statics at L could be perverse (subsidies
reduce giving) while those at H could be normal (subsidies induce giving), which
rules out the use of incentives at L. We demonstrate how public policy, in the form
of temporary direct government grants to charity can engineer a move from L to
H. We use a welfare analysis to determine the optimal mix of private and public
contributions to charity. Our paper contributes to the broader and more fundamental
question of using public policy to engineer moves between multiple equilibria.
Keywords: Multiple equilibria; privately supplied public goods; aggregate strate-
gic substitutes and complements; competitive and non-cooperative equilibria; direct
grants; charitable redistribution; voluntary contributions to public goods; optimal mix
of public and private giving.
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+44-116-2522898. Fax: +44-116-2522908. E-mail: aa10@le.ac.uk.￿To construct an acceptable theory of philanthropy one must therefore jettison at least
one of the three assumptions of the public good theory - publicness, utility maximization
and Nash conjectures. One possibility is to drop the assumption of Nash conjectures while
keeping the other two ... when I contribute to a large charity, I do not imagine that my
action will have any signi￿cant e⁄ect, positive or negative, on other donors ... it may be
possible to develop a theory of philanthropy along these lines.￿Robert Sugden (Economic
Journal, 1982, page 348.)
1. Introduction
Charitable donations is a signi￿cant economic activity. For instance, in 2003 for the USA,
89 percent of all households gave to charity with the average annual gift being $1620, which
gives an aggregate total of about $100 billion; see, Mayr et al. (2009). The most recent
￿ World Giving Index￿published by the Charities Aid foundation used Gallup surveys of
195,000 people in 153 nations. It found that more than 70% of the population gave money
to some sort of charity in Australia, Ireland, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Netherlands,
Malta, Hong Kong, Thailand.1
We ￿rst highlight some relevant stylized facts, S1-S5, associated with charitable giv-
ing; see Andreoni (2006) for more details. S1: There is substantial heterogeneity in giving
between countries.2 S2: Individual private donors are the largest contributors.3 S3: Gov-
ernment direct grants are signi￿cant in terms of magnitude.4 S4: Contributions to charity
are typically tax deductible. For instance, the rate of charitable deductions is 50% in the
US and 17-29% for Canada. S5: Direct grants in the form of seed money or leadership con-
tributions (which precede private giving) made by governments, foundations, the national
lottery (as in the UK), or exceptionally rich individuals etc. are e¢ cacious.5
1.1. A simple setup
To ￿x ideas, consider n consumers who are indexed by i = 1;2;:::;n. Consumer i has in-
come mi ￿ 0, consumes ci ￿ 0 and makes a contribution gi ￿ 0 to a charity. Let aggregate
1See https://www.cafonline.org/research/publications/2010-publications/world-giving-index.aspx for
the index.
2As a percentage of GDP, for 1995-2000, non-religious philanthropic activity was in excess of 4% for
the Netherlands and Sweden; 3-4% for Norway and Tanzania; 2-3% for France, UK, USA; and less than
0.5% for India, Brazil, and Poland; see Salamon et al. (2004).
3For US data, for 2002, individuals accounted for 76.3 percent of the total charitable contributions.
Other givers are: foundations (11.2%), bequests (7.5%), corporations (5.1%); see Andreoni (2006).
4For non-US data, governments are typically the single most important contributors to charities. On
average, in the developed countries, charities receive close to half their total budget directly as grants from
the government, while the average for developing countries is about 21.6 percent; See the Johns Hopkins
Comparative Nonpro￿t Sector Project (http://www.jhu.edu/~cnp/).
5See, for instance, Karlan and List (2007), Potters et al. (2007), and Rondeau and List (2008).
1taxable income of all individuals be M. The government taxes individual incomes at the
rate t 2 [0;1], makes a direct grant, D ￿ 0, to the charity and subsidizes private giving
to charity at the rate s 2 [0;1].6 Charities typically perform two main functions. They
either make direct transfers to individuals or they collect money to supply some public
good. The charity in our model, which is a passive player, makes a direct transfer, ￿i ￿ 0,
to the ith consumer and possibly also ￿nances a public good.7
The sum of public and private contributions to charities is G = D +
Pn
i=1 gi. The
utility function of the ith giver to charity is ui(ci;gi;G); gi appears in the utility function
on account of a warm glow motive; ui could depend positively on G either because G
provides a public good or on account of altruism.
Consumer i chooses her level of giving, gi, so as to maximize her utility, ui, given her
budget constraint and the government instruments s and t. The government chooses its
instruments, s and t,8 to maximize a social welfare function, U (u1;u2;:::;un), correctly
anticipating the public￿ s choice of g1, g2, ... , gn (in the manner of a Stackelberg leader).
The economics of charity has elicited notable scholarship but it relies on the following
two essential features, which we relax in this paper. These two features are ￿ strategic
giving￿and ￿ unique Nash equilibrium￿ . We consider these in turn below.
1.2. Equilibrium: Strategic or Competitive?
When the consumers decide on their private giving, conditional on the choices made by
the government and the charity, there are the following two possibilities.
1. Strategic behavior. Each giver, i, chooses own giving, gi, so as to maximize own utility
conditional on the vector of donations of all other givers, g￿i. For tractability, many
models of charity typically restrict attention to a symmetric Nash equilibrium.9 The
strategic approach assumes critically that when someone decides to contribute, say
£10, to the Red Cross, they are engaged in a strategic game in charitable contribu-
tions with respect to all other givers. Certainly, no evidence of this is ever provided.
There is a great deal of evidence that the predictions of a Nash equilibrium are often,
and systematically, violated; see, Camerer (2003).10 Indeed, in a charity context, in
particular, Sugden (1982) has already argued that the predictions do not conform




7This basic setup implies that the budget constraint of giver, i, is ci + (1 ￿ s)gi ￿ (1 ￿ t)mi + ￿i,
i = 1;2;:::;n.
8D is then determined as a residual using the government budget constraint.
9But there are also several exceptions. For instance, Bergstrom et al. (1986) consider the case of
heterogenous individuals. However, in order to obtain sharper results, even they consider the symmetric
case in their section 4.
10For a more up to date reading list see the course page by Vincent Crawford at Oxford:
http://weber.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/SecondYrAdvMicroBehaviouralEcon
2with a Nash equilibrium.11 In the absence of any compelling evidence, it stretches
credulity to believe that individuals contributing relatively small amounts to charities
are playing a strategic non-cooperative game vis-a-vis all other contributors.
2. Competitive equilibrium: In this view, which we subscribe to in this paper, there
is a large number of contributors who are individually small. It would then seem
that an analysis based on competitive equilibrium in giving is more compelling. In
a competitive markets view, any gi is su¢ ciently small compared to G, so that each
giver, i, takes total giving, G, as exogenous.
1.3. Equilibrium: Unique or Multiple?
The literature has typically focussed on a unique strategic equilibrium in giving, ruling
out multiple equilibria by assumption. In contrast, multiple equilibria are endemic in
many important economic phenomena. This would seem particularly to be the case for
economics of charity. It is quite conceivable that the uncoordinated giving of a large
number of dispersed small donors gives rise to multiple equilibria, depending on the beliefs
held by the donors.
Suppose that individual private giving, gi, and aggregate giving, G (which is synony-
mous with the size of the charity in our paper), are strategic complements. This means
that the marginal utility of contributing an extra unit of gi is increasing in the level of G.
Now, if contributors believe that G will be high (low), then they are also induced to con-
tribute a large (small) amount, gi. Ex post, G would be high (low), con￿rming the givers￿
expectations. Hence, there could be several, self ful￿lling, equilibria. In some equilibria,
giving is high (H), while in other equilibria, giving is low (L).
We allow for multiple competitive equilibria in this paper. In the non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium framework of Cooper and John (1988) where all goods are private, strategic
complementarity is a necessary condition for multiple equilibria. On the other hand,
when some goods have the nature of a public good, we show that aggregate strategic
complementarity, a new concept that is a modi￿cation of strategic complementarity, is a
necessary condition for multiple equilibria.
1.4. Some implications of multiple equilibria
If multiple equilibria exist then one could rank them by the amount of aggregate giving
and also possibly socially rank the equilibria. There are two immediate implications.
11Large donors, on the other hand, may behave in a strategic manner (say, to establish green credentials)
but their share in the total contributions is small (5.1% for the US).
31. Multiple equilibria can potentially explain heterogeneity in giving. Among similar
societies, some can achieve the high equilibrium, H, while others can be stuck at the
low equilibrium, L.
2. At some equilibria one might obtain perverse comparative static results (i.e., an
increase in subsidy, s, reduces contributions). At other equilibria, the comparative
static results could be normal, in the sense that contributions respond positively to
incentives. Policy makers could, understandably, be interested in engineering a move
from a low equilibrium with perverse comparative statics (LP) to a high equilibrium
with normal comparative statics (HN), if such equilibria exist.
Suppose that we have two, and only two, equilibria, LP and HN, but that the economy
is stuck at LP. Consider a policy maker who desires to engineer a move from LP to HN.
How should the policy maker proceed? This question is of fundamental importance to
economics and has lacked satisfactory answers. We provide a concrete answer in the context
of the economics of charity. Clearly incentives for charitable giving, in the form of higher
subsidies, s, will not work at the equilibrium LP because of the perverse comparative static
e⁄ects. Suppose, instead, that the government gives a temporary direct grant, D, to the
charity, ￿nanced by an income tax.12 Let D exceed the level of aggregate contributions,
G, at LP. This makes the equilibrium at LP unfeasible (as shall show in greater detail
below), leaving HN as the only feasible equilibrium.
Once the economy arrives at the equilibrium HN (where the comparative statics are
normal), the government can withdraw the temporary direct grant, D, and successfully
stimulate private giving through greater subsidies. This is welfare improving, because,
unlike direct government grants, increased private giving confers warm glow on the con-
tributors. The applicability of these ideas is illustrated by examples where voluntary giving
contributes towards public redistribution or towards public goods (see Sections 3 and 7).13
1.5. A brief comparison with some other models of multiple equilibria
The rationale and implications of multiple equilibria in our paper are quite di⁄erent from
Andreoni￿ s (1998) strategic-Nash framework, which requires a special type of non-convexity
12Empirical evidence shows that crowding-out of private contributions by direct government grants, if
any, is quite small. See Andreoni (2006) for a discussion of the empirical evidence. Cornes and Sandler
(1994, p.419) show that crowding out is always likely to be less than full whenever there is a private
bene￿t (e.g., warm glow) that arises from the act of donating. It is also likely that some of the observed
crowding-out is due to moral hazard issues on account of the fund-raising activities by the charity. These
issues lie beyond the scope of our paper.
13These results also provide another explanation for the e⁄ectiveness of seed money or leadership dona-
tions. Seed money, leadership contributions and national lottery money in the UK play a role similar to
the direct grant, D, in our framework. Existing models assume a unique equilibrium, hence, we provide
an alternative explanation of this important phenomenon.
4in production. Andreoni (1998) distinguishes between two di⁄erent kinds of charities. (1)
Start-up charities that require some initial amount of contributions G (the set-up or ￿xed
costs) before the charity can even begin operations. (2) Continuing charities that have
already invested G in the past and are now running concerns.
Andreoni￿ s (1998) focus is only on start-up charities. There are two kinds of equilibria
for start-up charities. In one equilibrium, beliefs are that the charity will fail to raise
the amount G, hence, the consistency of actions with beliefs requires that gi = 0. In the
second equilibrium, beliefs are that the charity will successfully raise the amount G, and so
positive individual contributions become optimal, ful￿lling the original beliefs. Hence, if
leadership contributions are equal to or greater than G, then positive individual donations
are induced.
The reader will immediately note that our analysis di⁄ers very signi￿cantly from An-
dreoni￿ s (1998) important contribution. First, our analysis applies both, to start-up chari-
ties and to continuing charities, but particularly the latter where in Andreoni￿ s framework
there cannot be multiple equilibria. Second, Andreoni (1998) uses a non-cooperative sym-
metric Nash equilibrium analysis while we use a competitive analysis that is not restricted
to symmetric equilibria. Third, the critical feature that generates multiple equilibria in
our paper is not non-convexities in production but aggregate strategic complementarity, a
new concept that we introduce below. Fourth, the mechanisms to engineer moves between
various equilibria are di⁄erent in the two models. Fifth, the issue of perverse comparative
statics is critical in our case but not in Andreoni￿ s (1998). Sixth, unlike Andreoni (1998),
we perform a welfare analysis in a general equilibrium model with a government budget
constraint where the ￿scal parameters (such as s and t) are optimally determined.
The idea of engineering a move from a low equilibrium characterized by poverty traps
to an equilibrium with greater prosperity is important in development economics but it
relies on a di⁄erent mechanism.14
1.6. Results
We make nine main contributions. (1) Our proposed condition aggregate strategic com-
plementarity is a necessary condition for multiple equilibria in a competitive equilibrium
in charitable contributions. (2) We show that a Nash equilibrium in giving converges
to a competitive equilibrium as the number of givers increases. (3) For the case of our
two examples, and for the parameters chosen, even for relatively small numbers of con-
tributors, the competitive solution is close to the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. (4)
Multiple equilibria provide a possible explanation of heterogeneity in charitable giving.
14See Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) for an early idea. Murphy et al. (1989) focus on the mechanism of aggre-
gate demand spillover arising from a coordinated increase in outputs in a range of imperfectly competitive
industries. However, our mechanism for engineering moves between equilibria is very di⁄erent.
5(5) Using temporary direct grants, a policy maker can engineer a move from the low to
the high equilibrium. This is particularly desirable when comparative statics at the low
equilibrium are perverse and those at the high equilibrium are normal. (6) When com-
parative statics at the low equilibrium are normal and those at the high equilibrium are
perverse, the government can do better than simply encouraging subsidy-induced giving
at the low equilibrium. Indeed, once the government successfully engineers a move to the
high equilibrium using temporary direct grants, the perverse comparative statics at the
high equilibrium ensure that a reduction in subsides will induce even greater private giving.
(7) By carrying out a welfare analysis, we give conditions that specify the optimal mix of
public contributions and private contributions to charity. (8) We show that our results are
equally applicable to redistributive and public goods contexts. (9) A key technical device
is our proposed aggregate desire to give function; this may prove useful in other contexts.
Section 2 formulates the theoretical model. Section 3 gives two illustrative examples of
voluntary private contributions to redistribution and public good provision, respectively.
Section 4 derives the equilibria of the model and their comparative static results. Section
5 examines multiple equilibria in aggregate giving in more detail. Section 6 performs a
welfare analysis and characterizes the normatively optimal public policy. Section 7 provides
an explicit solution and numerical analyses of the two examples of Section 3. Section 8
discusses dynamic issues. Section 9 establishes the convergence of a Nash equilibrium in
giving to a competitive equilibrium as the number of givers increases. Section 10 concludes.
Most proofs are in the appendix.
2. Formal model
There are three types of players in the economy, (1) consumers, (2) a ￿scal authority or
Government, and (3) charities. There are n consumers indexed by i = 1;2;:::;n. Consumer





The government exercises the following two ￿scal instruments. (i) An income tax on
individual incomes, mi, at the rate t 2 [0;1]. (ii) A subsidy to private giving to charity at
the rate, s 2 [0;1]. The direct public contribution to charity, D ￿ 0, is determined as the
residual using the government budget constraint.
62.2. Consumers
The utility function of consumer i is
u
i (ci;gi;G), (2.2)
where ci is private consumption expenditure of individual i, gi ￿ 0 is his contribution
to charity, it re￿ ects the warm glow or prestige (also known as impure altruism) from
own contribution15 and G ￿ 0 is the aggregate level of giving to charity. G bears two
interpretations. G could re￿ ect pure altruism on the part of individuals (see Example
3.1, below) or G could be the aggregate level of public goods (see Example 3.2, below).
There is overwhelming experimental/￿eld evidence and growing neuroeconomic evidence
that justi￿es such a formulation.16
Remark 1 (Notation): Superscripts on the utility function denote the identity of individ-
ual givers (e.g., ui is the utility function of the ith giver). On the other hand, subscripts
are used to denote partial derivatives (e.g., ui
2 = @ui=@gi).
The assumptions on preferences are quite standard. ci is bounded below by a constant,
ci ￿ 0 (possibly a subsistence level). We assume that ui is a C2 function (continuous, with
continuous ￿rst and second partial derivatives) for gi > 0 and ci > ci. We also assume
that ui
1 > 0, ui
11 ￿ 0 (strictly positive but non-increasing marginal utility of consumption),
ui
2 ￿ 0, ui
3 ￿ 0 (non-negative marginal utilities of own and aggregate giving) and ui
22 ￿ 0
(concavity in own giving). In addition, we assume that, for some i, ui
2 > 0 and mi￿ci > 0.
The last assumption guarantees that at least one consumer is willing and able to give to
charity.
We make three technical assumptions. The ￿rst assumption guarantees the concavity








22 < 0: (2.3)
The second technical assumption ensures an interior solution for ci,
u
i
1 " 1 as ci # ci. (2.4)
15The introduction of a warm glow motive was suggested by Cornes and Sandler (1984) and Andreoni
(1989, 1990). The presence of a warm glow term re￿ ects the fact that individuals no longer consider their
contributions to be perfect substitutes for the contributions of others. Hence, there is extra utility from
one￿ s own contribution, which mitigates the free rider problem arising from purely altruistic considerations,
i.e., from a utility function of the form ui (ci;G). It also obviously implies that government grants to
charities do not crowd out private donations completely because the two are imperfect substitutes from
the point of view of givers.
16For the evidence on altruism, see Andreoni (2006). For experimental evidence on warm glow prefer-
ences, see Andreoni (1993, 2006), Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) and Andreoni and Miller (2002). For the
neuroeconomic evidence see, for instance, Harbaugh et al. (2007), Moll et al. (2006), and for a survey of
the neuroeconomic evidence see Mayr et al. (2009).
7In words, the marginal utility of consumption tends to in￿nity as consumption tends to
its lower bound from above.
Our third technical assumption is that either
u





2 " 1 as gi # 0. (2.6)
We require one of (2.5), (2.6) to hold. Thus, (2.5) holds for Example 3.1 and (2.6) holds
for Example 3.2, below.
Examples that satisfy the above assumptions include u =
p
c+g or u = ln(c ￿ 1)+lng.
The more complex Examples 1 and 2 in Section 3 also satisfy these assumptions.
The budget constraint of consumer i is given by
ci + (1 ￿ s)gi ￿ (1 ￿ t)mi + ￿i. (2.7)
The RHS of (2.7) is total income which comprises of the after-tax income plus an individual-
speci￿c transfer, ￿i ￿ 0, received from the charity. The LHS is total expenditure which is
made up of private consumption plus the (net of subsidy) private charitable giving. The
instruments of the government are s and t. The charity determines ￿i (see Remark 4
below).
If s = 1, then the budget constraint (2.7) of each consumer reduces to ci ￿ (1 ￿ t)mi+
￿i. If ui
2 > 0 (and we have assumed this to be the case for at least one consumer) then it
would follow that gi = 1. This is, clearly, not feasible. Hence, s < 1. Thus warm glow is
never a free good.
Furthermore, we assume that each gi is a small fraction of G, so that each consumer
takes the aggregate G as given17. Similarly, and we believe quite realistically, consumer i
takes ￿i as given. Thus, in making her decision to allocate after-tax income between ci and
gi, the consumer takes as given mi, ￿i, s, t, G (as in the theory of competitive markets)
and maximizes ui given in (2.2) subject to the budget constraint (2.7).
Remark 2 : We treat aggregate consumer expenditure, ci, as a composite good whose
relative price is unity. We treat, gi, as a good whose relative price is 1￿s. It is standard in
economics to postulate that consumers derive utility from the bundles of goods consumed,
not the expenditure on them. Therefore, it is right that gi enters the utility function in
(2.2) and not (1 ￿ s)gi. Thus, in particular, a giver can enjoy warm glow from giving even
if its price, 1 ￿ s, is very low.
17Our approach can, of course, be made completely rigorous by adopting an appropriate measure-
theoretic formulation with a continuum of consumers. We have found this to considerably complicate
our paper, without adding anything to either our conclusions or the literature on the measure-theoretic
approach to economics.
8Remark 3 (Warm glow, taxes and private giving): One might ask why in our model does
direct private giving to charities yield a warm glow while paying taxes does not? One
reason is that giving to charity is voluntary while paying taxes is not. Another reason
is empirical. People do enjoy warm glow from giving but, generally, resent paying taxes.
Also, in actual practice, when an individual contributes a Euro towards tax payments he
does not know what fraction of that Euro will be used by the government towards support
of his chosen charity. Hence, it is natural that individuals derive a relatively greater warm
glow from direct giving to charity as compared to indirect giving by paying taxes. For
pedagogical simplicity we have chosen to model warm glow arising only through direct
giving. Our results also carry through if there is some warm glow arising through indirect
giving, so long as the warm glow through direct giving is relatively greater.
2.3. Government
The government collects income tax revenue equal to
Pn
i=1 tmi = t
Pn
i=1 mi = tM. This
is used to ￿nance subsidies for donations to charity, s
Xn
i=1 gi, and on aggregate direct
grants from the government to the charities, D ￿ 0. Therefore, the (balanced) government
budget constraint is
tM = D + s
Xn
i=1 gi. (2.8)








which is strictly increasing in the individual utility functions, u1;u2;:::;un.18
Since s ￿ 0, t ￿ 0, D ￿ 0 and gi ￿ 0 we get, from (2.8), that
gi ￿ M, for each i. (2.10)
2.4. Charities
In order to focus on the simultaneous determinants of private giving and the in￿ uence
of public policy, we assume that charities are passive players in the game. They merely
collect all donations from private consumers,
Xn
i=1 gi, and from the government, D. Let
G = D +
Xn
i=1 gi. (2.11)
The charity uses G to ￿nance transfers to individuals,
Xn
i=1 ￿i, while using the balance
G￿
Xn
i=1 ￿i to ￿nance provision of public goods.19 For feasibility we shall assume that for
18Note that the resulting social optimum is constrained by the available set of instruments fs;tg. In
particular, an even better social optimum may be available if subsidies and taxes fsi;tig could be varied
across individuals. We assume that this is either not desirable or not possible (although it is straightforward
to extend our analysis to cope with the more general case).
19One example of each of these uses is given in Section 3.
9each i, ci < (1 ￿ t)mi +￿i, i.e., each consumer has enough disposable income for minimal
consumption, with at least a bit left over.
Remark 4 (Active and passive charities): In our paper charities are passive players.
However, in actual practice, charities could act strategically to attract extra donations or
respond to direct government grants by raising less money; see, for instance, Andreoni
(2006). This could then endogenously determine the split into redistribution and public
good provision and the determination of individual-speci￿c redistribution (￿1, ￿2, ::: ,
￿n). However, treating charities as active or passive players is not critical to our paper.
Suppose charities were active players, and suppose that the government and the charities
simultaneously or sequentially choose their respective policies (taxes, redistribution and
even fund-raising) followed by private giving of individuals. So long as charities cannot
completely negate the e⁄ect of direct government grants (an assumption that is supported
by the evidence) then all our results go through. However, our approach is pedagogically
simpler and clearer.
Remark 5 (The nature of redistribution): In our model, redistribution is carried out by
charities only. One could extend the model to allow for direct public redistribution in addi-
tion to charitable redistribution. In this richer model, a part of tax revenues ￿nance public
redistribution, while the remaining part ￿nances direct grants to charities and subsidizes
private charitable giving. However, that adds nothing substantial to our framework or to
the main insights that we o⁄er. Hence, we have chosen the current level of abstraction to
make our points as clearly as possible.
Remark 6 (A special case): Suppose that individuals make voluntary contributions to-
wards the provision of a public good and that ￿i = 0 for all i. Then our model reduces to
the case of privately provided public goods, ￿nanced by voluntary contributions. Indeed
over human history many important public goods have been provided in this manner at
some point in time or the other.20
2.5. Sequence of moves
The charity moves ￿rst, to announce the parameters ￿1;￿2;:::;￿n. The government moves
next to announce the parameters s, t and D.21 Finally, the consumers move simultaneously.
Consumer i, i = 1;2;:::;n, chooses gi so as to maximize her utility, ui (ci;gi;G), subject
to her budget constraint, ci + (1 ￿ s)gi ￿ (1 ￿ t)mi + ￿i, and given G, s, t, mi and
￿i. In particular, consumers are ￿ G-takers￿ , just as under general competitive equilibrium
20This includes many standard examples of public goods, defence, lighthouses, information on marine
navigation, shipping intelligence, mail services, education, public works etc.
21We shall see below that announcing D can help coordinate private expectations of the level of G.
10consumers are price takers. An equilibrium, G￿, is a value of G that equates supply and
demand for charitable giving, just as in general competitive equilibrium an equilibrium
price vector, p￿, is a vector of prices that equates aggregate supply of each good to its
aggregate demand.
We solve the model backwards. Consumer i, i = 1;2;:::;n, chooses gi so as to maximize
her utility, ui (ci;gi;G), subject to her budget constraint, ci + (1 ￿ s)gi ￿ (1 ￿ t)mi + ￿i,
and given G, s, t, mi and ￿i. The government chooses s and t given ￿1;￿2;:::;￿n cor-
rectly anticipating the consumers￿choices of g1;g2;:::;gn. The charity chooses ￿1;￿2;:::;￿n
(through some unmodelled process because they are passive players) correctly anticipating
s, t, g1;g2;:::;gn.
2.6. Some preliminary results
Since ui
1 > 0, the budget constraint (2.7) holds with equality. Hence, we can use it to
eliminate ci from (2.2). Letting Ui (gi;G;s;t) be the result, we have
U
i (gi;G;s;t) = u
i ((1 ￿ t)mi + ￿i ￿ (1 ￿ s)gi;gi;G). (2.12)
From (2.3) and (2.12) it follows that
U
i
11 < 0. (2.13)
In a competitive equilibrium, consumers take as given the total contributions, G. Hence,
the consumer￿ s maximization problem is22
Maximizehgijs;t;Gi U
i (gi;G;s;t) subject to 0 ￿ gi ￿
1
1 ￿ s
[(1 ￿ t)mi + ￿i ￿ ci]. (2.14)
The constraint follows from (2.7) and from the assumption that gi, ci are bounded below
by zero and ci, respectively.
Proposition 1 : Suppose ci < (1 ￿ t)mi + ￿i.
(a) The consumer￿ s maximization problem (2.14) has a unique solution, g￿
i.
(b) 0 ￿ g￿
i < 1
1￿s [(1 ￿ t)mi + ￿i ￿ ci].
(c) If, in addition, (2.6) holds, then g￿
i > 0.
Since g￿
i is unique, we can write it as a function of the parameters that are exogenous to
the consumer￿ s maximization problem (2.14). In particular, we write g￿
i (s;t;G) explicitly
as a function of the tax rate, t, the subsidy rate, s, and aggregate giving, G.23
22Recall that s < 1.
23We have suppressed other parameters such as ￿i and mi to improve readability.
11A simple calculation shows that Proposition 1(b) implies the following:









On the left hand side of the second inequality in (2.15) we have the total amount paid in
taxes and donations to charity (net of subsidy). On the right hand side of the inequal-
ity we have total pre-tax income minus total expenditure on subsistence consumption.
Clearly, the former cannot exceed the latter. However, from (2.4) it follows that opti-
mal consumption must be strictly higher than subsistence consumption. Hence, the strict
inequality.
Lemma 1, below, gives technical results that are important for the paper.
Lemma 1 : Suppose g￿
i > 0. Let c￿
i = (1 ￿ t)mi + ￿i ￿ (1 ￿ s)g￿











































2.7. Strategic complements and strategic substitutes
Following Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985), strategic complements and strategic
substitutes can be de￿ned as follows.
De￿nition 1 : (Strategic complements and substitutes) gi and G are strategic comple-
ments (substitutes) if, and only if, @2Ui
@gi@G > 0 (￿ 0).
Thus, gi and G are strategic complements (respectively, substitutes) if the marginal
utility to individual i of making an extra unit of contribution, gi, increases (respectively,
decreases) with an increase in aggregate contributions, G.
Lemma 2 : gi and G are strategic complements (substitutes) if, and only if,
u
i
23 ￿ (1 ￿ s)u
i
13 > 0 (￿ 0).




> 0 (￿ 0).
3. Two examples
In this section we present two examples of the general theoretical model. In Example
1 (subsection 3.1) charitable contributions provide income to consumers who, otherwise,
have no income. In Example 2 (subsection 3.2) charitable contributions ￿nance public
good provision. Section 7 will provide explicit solutions and numerical analysis of these
two examples. Section 9 will establish that a Nash equilibrium in giving converges to a
competitive equilibrium, and illustrates this in the context of our two examples.
123.1. Example 1: Charitable contributions as public redistribution
We consider an economy where some consumers have no income. Their consumption
expenditure is ￿nanced entirely by either charitable donations, gi, made by other ￿ caring￿
consumers with positive income and/or by tax ￿nanced direct government grants, D (which
now have the interpretation of social welfare payments). This is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
The assumptions are as follows.
1. There are n consumers. Of these, p consumers, 0 < p < n, and indexed by i =
1;2;:::;p, have positive income (mi > 0). The other n ￿ p consumers, indexed by
i = p + 1;:::;n, have no income (mi = 0). All incomes are publicly observable.
2. The aggregate of all donations to charity (private and public), G, is divided among
the consumers with no income. Hence, ￿i = 0, i = 1;2;:::;p and
Xn
i=p+1 ￿i = G.
3. Of the p consumers with positive incomes, k, 0 < k ￿ p, care about the plight of
those with no income. Each of these caring consumers has the utility function
u
i (ci;gi;G) = lnci + aigiG, ai > 0, i = 1;:::;k, (3.1)






mi, i = 1;:::;k. (3.2)
4. The other p￿k consumers have positive income but do not care about those with no
income. The utility function of the latter two groups of consumers (the non-caring
with positive income and those with no income) is given by
u
i = lnci, i = k + 1;:::;n. (3.3)
From (3.1) and Lemma 2, it follows that gi, G are strategic complements.
133.2. Example 2: Voluntary contributions to a public good
Individuals often voluntarily contribute to, and directly use, several kinds of public goods
such as health services and education24. Suppose that the utility function of consumer i,
i = 1;2;:::;n is given by
u






+ ai lngi, (3.4)
where
0 < ai < 1, bi > 0,
bi
G
< (1 ￿ t)mi. (3.5)
Condition (3.5) guarantees that consumer i has enough disposable income, (1 ￿ t)mi, to
sustain a level of private consumption expenditure, ci, greater than
bi
G and also a positive
level of donation to charity, gi. It is straightforward to check that ui
1 > 0, ui
2 > 0, ui
3 > 0.
This example can be given the following interpretation. Private (voluntary) contribu-
tions to public goods,
Xn
i=1 gi, plus public contribution, D, ￿nanced from income taxation,
provide the necessary infrastructure for private consumption, ci. An increase in aggregate
expenditure on infrastructure, G = D +
Xn
i=1 gi, leads to a higher level of utility for a
given level of ci. Using Lemma 2 and (3.4), gi, G are strategic complements.25
4. Equilibrium giving and public policy
Let us begin with an analogy of competitive markets in an exchange economy. Suppose
there are n consumers whose vectors of initial endowments are !1;!2;:::;!n. Let the price
vector be p. Denote the utility maximizing demand vector of the ith consumer by xi (p;!i).
The aggregate demand vector is then
Pn
i=1 xi (p;!i). The aggregate supply is, of course,
Pn
i=1 !i. There is no guarantee that at an arbitrary price vector, p, aggregate desire
to consume,
Pn
i=1 xi (p;!i), will be equal to aggregate supply,
Pn
i=1 !i. A competitive






The competitive equilibrium in charitable donations is determined in an analogous manner,
which we turn to below.
24For the US, education, health and human services account for the greatest proportion of private giving
after religion; see Table 3 in Andreoni (2006).
25One can check that
ui
23 ￿ (1 ￿ s)ui
13 =
(1 ￿ s)bi(1 ￿ ai)
(ciG ￿ bi)2 > 0:
144.1. The aggregate desire to give to charity26
When making their charity decision, consumers take as given aggregate donations to char-
ity, G, and determine their optimal charitable contributions, g￿
i (s;t;G). Just as the aggre-
gate demand in competitive markets need not equal actual aggregate supply for all price
vectors, the aggregate of all desired donations, D+
Xn
i=1 g￿
i (s;t;G), need not equal actual
aggregate contributions, G. Therefore, we introduce a new function, F, which represents
the aggregate of all desires (public and private) to give to charity:





From the government budget constraint, (2.8), we get





From (4.1) and (4.2) we get





From (2.15), (4.3) it follows that





To reduce the length of formulae, let






0 ￿ F (s;t;G) < Fmax. (4.6)
Recalling that individuals take s;t as given at this stage, hence, without loss of generality,
we may view F (s;t;G) as a mapping from [0;Fmax] to [0;Fmax].
The above discussion suggests the following de￿nition.
De￿nition 2 : By the aggregate desire to give we mean the mapping, F (s;t;G) : [0;Fmax] !
[0;Fmax], de￿ned by
















In general, gi and G could be strategic complements for consumer i but strategic substitutes
for consumer j, j 6= i. So, we might wish to ask if in some aggregate sense, g and G are
strategic complements or substitutes. Lemma 3 and (4.7) suggest the following de￿nition.
26Our solution method has some similarities with the techniques developed in Cornes and Hartley (2007).
15De￿nition 3 (Aggregate strategic complements and substitutes): g and G are aggregate






> 0 (￿ 0).
From De￿nition 3, strategic complementarity (or substitutability) for all individuals is
su¢ cient but not necessary for aggregate strategic complementarity (or substitutability).
A global analogue of De￿nition 3 can also be given.
De￿nition 4 (Global aggregate strategic complements and substitutes): g and G are
global aggregate strategic complements (substitutes) if De￿nition 3 holds at all feasible
levels of G.
Lemma 4 : g and G are aggregate strategic complements (substitutes) at G if, and only
if,
FG (s;t;G) > 0 (￿ 0). (4.8)
If condition 4.8 holds for all permissible levels of G then we get global aggregate strategic
complements and substitutes.
4.2. Competitive Equilibria
De￿nition 5 (Competitive equilibrium in giving): The economy is in a competitive equi-
librium if, and only if, the aggregate of all desires to donate to charity, F, equals the
aggregate of all donations, G, i.e., G￿ 2 [0;Fmax] is an equilibrium if, and only if,
G
￿ = F (s;t;G
￿).
De￿nition 6 (Isolated equilibrium): An equilibrium, G￿, is isolated if there is a neigh-
borhood of G￿ in which it is the only equilibrium.
Proposition 2 : (a) An equilibrium, G￿ 2 [0;Fmax], exists and satis￿es 0 ￿ G￿ < Fmax.
(b) If FG < 1 for all G 2 [0;Fmax] (and, in particular, if g and G are global aggregate
strategic substitutes, i.e., FG ￿ 0 for all G 2 [0;Fmax]), then an equilibrium, G￿, is unique.
(c) If [FG]G￿ 6= 1, then G￿ is an isolated equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2: (a) Recall that in a competitive equilibrium, G￿ = F (s;t;G￿).
Let
H (s;t;G) = G ￿ F (s;t;G):
If F (s;t;0) = 0 then, clearly, 0 is an equilibrium. F (s;t;0) < 0 is not feasible. If
F (s;t;0) > 0, then
H (s;t;0) = ￿F (s;t;0) < 0.
16From (4.6), F (s;t;G) < Fmax, hence,
H (s;t;Fmax) = Fmax ￿ F (s;t;Fmax) > 0.
Since H (s;t;G) is continuous, it follows that H (s;t;G￿) = 0 for some G￿ 2 [0;Fmax), i.e.,
G
￿ = F (s;t;G
￿) and 0 ￿ G
￿ < Fmax.








@G < 1 for all G 2 [0;Fmax] then @H
@G > 0 for all possible values of G. Thus, in this
case, the equilibrium is unique. In particular, if g and G are global aggregate strategic
substitutes then, by Lemma 4, @F
@G ￿ 0 for all G 2 [0;Fmax] and, hence, the equilibrium is
unique.
(c) If [FG]G￿ 6= 1 then [HG]G￿ 6= 0 and, hence, G￿ is an isolated solution of H (s;t;G) =
0. ￿
Figure 4.1: Unique and multiple equilibria.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the results in Proposition 2. Three possible shapes of the function
H(s;t;G) are shown. Along the curve AED, the su¢ cient condition for uniqueness, FG < 1,
for all G 2 [0;Fmax] holds, and we have a unique equilibrium at E. Along the two paths,
ABCD and AHD, this su¢ cient condition is violated. In particular, along these curves
we observe values of G for which FG > 1 (i.e., gi and G are strategic complements). In
this case, we could have a unique equilibrium (as in the case of curve AHD) or multiple
equilibria (as in the case of curve ABCD); see also our examples 3.1 and 3.2. All equilibria
shown in Figure 4.1 satisfy [FG]G￿ 6= 1, hence, they are all isolated equilibria.
174.3. Equilibrium analysis: Normal, neutral and perverse comparative statics
We now investigate how aggregate equilibrium giving to charity, G, responds to the policy
instruments, s;t. We, therefore, consider an equilibrium, G￿, at which FG 6= 1. By
Proposition 2c, such an equilibrium is isolated. We can then regard G￿ as a C1 function,
G￿ (s;t), of s and t in that neighborhood (this is a special case of the implicit function























Proposition 3 gives some comparative static results for an isolated equilibrium.
Proposition 3 : Let G￿ be an equilibrium at which FG (s;t;G￿) 6= 1. Then G￿ is isolated
and
(a) G￿
s (s;t) = Fs
1￿FG, (b) G￿







We now de￿ne the critical concepts of normal, neutral and perverse comparative statics.
De￿nition 7 (Normal, neutral and perverse incentives):
(a) Comparative statics are normal if G￿
s > 0, i.e., if an increase in the subsidy, s, to
private charitable giving increases aggregate equilibrium contributions.
(b) Comparative statics are neutral if G￿
s = 0, i.e., if an increase in the subsidy, s, to
private charitable giving leaves unchanged aggregate equilibrium contributions.
(c) Comparative statics are perverse if G￿
s < 0, i.e., if an increase in the subsidy, s, to
private charitable giving reduces aggregate equilibrium contributions.
A glance at the statement of Proposition 3 will easily motivate the Corollary below.
Corollary 1 : (a) Comparative statics are normal if (i) Fs > 0 and FG < 1 or if (ii)
Fs < 0 and FG > 1.
(b) Comparative statics are neutral if Fs = 0.
(c) Comparative statics are perverse if (i) Fs > 0 and FG > 1 or if (ii) Fs < 0 and FG < 1.
For ease of reference and to facilitate the discussion in subsequent sections, we have
found it helpful to organize the results in this subsection in Propositions 4 and 5 below.
Proposition 4 : Let G￿ be an equilibrium at which FG (s;t;G￿) 6= 1. Then
(a) Let Fs > 0 at G￿.
(i) If FG < 1 at G￿ then G￿
s (s;t) > 0 (normal comparative statics). (ii) In particular, if
18Figure 4.2: Fs > 0; s1 < s2. 0 < FG < 1 (continuous, light lines). FG > 1 (dashed lines)
g, G are aggregate strategic substitutes (FG ￿ 0), then G￿
s (s;t) > 0. (iii) If FG > 1 at G￿
then G￿
s (s;t) < 0 (perverse comparative statics).
(b) Let Ft > 0 at G￿.
(i) If FG < 1 at G￿ then G￿
t (s;t) > 0. (ii) In particular, if g, G are aggregate strategic
substitutes (FG ￿ 0), then G￿
t (s;t) > 0. (iii) If FG > 1 at G￿ then G￿
t (s;t) < 0.
Proposition 5 : Let G￿ be an equilibrium at which FG 6= 1. Then
(a) Let Fs < 0 at G￿.
(i) If FG < 1 at G￿ then G￿
s (s;t) < 0 (perverse comparative statics). (ii) In particular, if
gi, G are aggregate strategic substitutes (FG ￿ 0), then G￿
s (s;t) < 0. (iii) If FG > 1 at G￿
then G￿
s (s;t) > 0 (normal comparative statics).
(b) Let Ft < 0 at G￿.
(i) If FG < 1 at G￿ then G￿
t (s;t) < 0. (ii) In particular, if gi, G are aggregate strategic
substitutes (FG ￿ 0), then G￿
t (s;t) < 0. (iii) If FG > 1 at G￿ then G￿
t (s;t) > 0.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the two cases of normal and perverse comparative statics in
Proposition 4(a). In Figure 4.2, Fs > 0 for all values of G and s1 < s2. The 45o line,
F = G, is shown as the dark line. The case 0 < FG < 1 is illustrated by the two, thin,
continuous straight lines, while the other case, FG > 1 is shown by the two dashed lines.27
Thus, in each case, from Lemma 4, g and G are aggregate strategic complements. Figure
4.2 shows the outcome arising from an increase in subsidy from s1 to s2, ￿nanced by an
increased in taxes from t1 to t2.
27The conditions in Proposition 4 are local conditions. For pedagogical purposes, Figure 4.2 is drawn
when these conditions hold globally, i.e., the conditions 0 < FG < 1 and FG > 1 hold for all values of G.
19A. Normal comparative statics (G￿
s > 0): Figure 4.2 illustrates Proposition 4(ai) for the
case Fs > 0, 0 < FG < 1 (although only FG < 1 is required) by an upward shift of
the continuous, light, curve F (s1;t1;G) to F (s2;t2;G). The equilibrium moves from
A to B. Hence, the optimal level of aggregate giving, G, is increasing in the subsidy
to individual giving, i.e., G￿
s > 0.
B. Perverse comparative statics (G￿
s < 0). This case is shown in Figure 4.2, by an
upward shift of the dashed curve F (s1;t1;G) to F (s2;t2;G), which assumes Fs > 0,
FG > 1, as required in Proposition 4(aiii). The equilibrium moves from B to A.
Equilibrium aggregate contributions, G, decrease as the price of giving reduces (larger
s). Because FG > 1, consumers over-react to an increase in G. Thus, paradoxically,
G needs to fall in order to ensure equilibrium in the market for charity.28 The
surprising e⁄ects of the tax reforms of the 1980￿ s on charitable giving in the US is
a potential example of perverse comparative statics; see, Clotfelter (1990). The tax
reforms increased the price of giving by reducing the tax preference for charitable
donations. Contrary to the predictions, charitable contributions continued to rise in
the following years.
4.4. D and t as instruments
In most of the paper, we assume that the government￿ s instruments are the subsidy, s, to
private giving and the tax rate, t, with the public grant to charity, D, determined as the
residual using the government budget constraint. For Propositions 7 and 8, below, it is
more convenient to view the government instruments as D and t; with s then determined by
the government budget constraint. The following lemma will be useful in welfare analysis,
below.
















5. Equilibrium analysis with multiple equilibria
Suppose we have two equilibria, G￿ < G+. Suppose that the economy is at G￿ and we
wish to move it to G+. Clearly, if it is possible for the government to give a direct grant,
D, G￿ < D < G+, then, from (2.11), we see that G+ becomes the only feasible candidate.
But we wish to go further. Does such a D exist? Once G+ is established, can we phase
28To aid intuition, imagine an upward sloping demand curve that cuts the supply curve from below.
Following an increase in income, we get the perverse result that price (and quantity) will fall. In demand
theory this case requires atypical assumptions such as gi⁄en goods. By contrast, in the charity context
such cases arise naturally; aggregate strategic complementarity being a necessary condition.
20out D? Would this cause G+ to decline or increase further? Could the economy revert
back to G￿? It is questions like these that we address below.
There is no reason to suppose that the equilibrium with perverse comparative statics
is ￿ unstable￿and that with normal comparative statics is ￿ stable￿ ; see section 8 below.
We investigate one case in detail: Fs > 0;Ft > 0;FG > 0;FGG < 0 (subsection 5.2)
The case Fs = G￿
s = 0 (neutral comparative statics) is considered in detail via Example 2
in subsection 7.2, below. All other cases can be dealt with in a similar fashion. We begin
with an reasonable assumption which we call ￿stability of beliefs￿ .
5.1. Stability of beliefs
Suppose one has two equilibria. In some sense, suppose that one of the two equilibria is
￿ good￿and the other is ￿ bad￿ . Ideally, one would like to adopt an explicitly dynamic model
in which beliefs endogenously evolve over time as individuals engage in learning.29 In the
absence of a satisfactory resolution of this problem, one needs to fall back on some ad-hoc
(though hopefully plausible) assumption about the stability of beliefs. This is an issue in
all static economic models.30
Consider a problem in coordination where people have to decide whether to drive on
the left or the right of the road. Suppose that one lives in the UK. People drive on the
left, safe in their beliefs that all others will also drive on the left. A similar observation
applies to people in the US, except that expectations are to drive on the right. One could
compare each of these countries at a point of time in the past when expectations were not
coordinated on the good equilibrium (all drive on one side of the road) but rather were
uncoordinated on a bad equilibrium (people drive on di⁄erent sides of the road). What this
example illustrates powerfully is the idea that when a good equilibrium gets established,
then, with time people come to expect that the good equilibrium will prevail.
In other words once established, beliefs may exhibit inertia to change, i.e., they may
be stable. In a charity context, once the Red Cross is established as a ￿large￿charity then
beliefs are that it will be large next period.
Weber (2006) asks if coordination can be grown in the lab as one gradually increases
the group size. The main ￿nding is that coordination in groups can be grown gradually
from a small enough size of groups where cooperation is already existent but not other-
wise. The norm of cooperation is then learnt by successive entrants, who also cooperate.
These ￿ndings again illustrate the stability of beliefs on a good equilibrium when a good
equilibrium is established.
29Most traditional learning models do not perform too well when taken to the evidence although some
behavioral models of learning do better; see Camerer (2003).
30See Section 8, below for further discussion of these issues.
21In the context of our speci￿c model, we illustrate the stability of beliefs in Figure 5.1.
Suppose that we have two equilibria, G￿(s;t) and G+(s;t) such that G￿(s;t) < G+(s;t).
Suppose that the comparative statics along G￿ are perverse, i.e., G￿
s < 0, while those
along G+ are normal, i.e., G+
s > 0.31 Figure 5.1 illustrates the nature of these comparative
static results.
Figure 5.1: Persistence in beliefs
Suppose that we begin at point ￿ a￿on the G￿ locus, where G￿
s < 0. As we vary
s we will simply trace out various points on the G￿ locus. Now suppose that we can
somehow engineer a jump to the G+ locus, say, to point ￿ b￿where G+
s > 0 (point b need
not be directly above point a). Once the economy is on the G+ locus (at point, b, say)
for a su¢ cient length of time then the stability of beliefs requires that as we adjust s the
economy moves along the G+ locus.
5.2. Engineering moves between equilibria: The case Fs > 0, Ft > 0, FG > 0,
FGG < 0
Suppose that the objective of the government is to move the economy from a low equi-
librium with perverse comparative statics to a high equilibrium with normal comparative
statics. We now discuss this critical question that is central to our paper. We shall con-
sider in detail the case, Fs > 0, Ft > 0, FG > 0, FGG < 0. The case Fs = G￿
s = 0 (neutral
comparative statics) is considered in detail via Example 2 in subsection 7.2, below. All
other cases can be dealt with in a similar fashion, so we omit a discussion of these cases.
Figure 5.2, below, sketches the case FG > 0, FGG < 0. Thus F is strictly increasing and
strictly concave in G. We assume that s1 < s2. since Fs > 0, it follows that the graph of
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Figure 5.2: The case s1 < s2 with t1 ￿xed
F (s2;t1;G) is strictly above that of F (s1;t1;G). There are four equilibria: a (G￿(s1;t1))
and d (G+(s1;t1)) corresponding to the parameter values (s1;t1); and b (G￿ (s2;t1)) and
c (G+(s2;t1)) corresponding to the parameter values (s2;t1). Furthermore, we see that
FG > 1 at points a (G￿(s1;t1)) and b (G￿(s2;t1)) but FG < 1 at points c (G+(s2;t1)) and
d (G+(s1;t1)).
Suppose now that the economy is at point a, with G = G￿(s1;t1), in 5.2. Also suppose
that (for whatever reason) the government wants to shift the economy from a to d, where
the latter point corresponds to G = G+(s1;t1). Since Fs > 0 and FG > 1 at point a it
follows, from Corollary 1c(i), that comparative statics at a are perverse (G￿
s < 0). Hence,
an increase is s would make things worse by reducing aggregate giving, G, as is clear from
Figure 5.2. In particular, an increase is s, from s1 to s2, would reduce aggregate giving,
from G￿(s1;t1) to G￿(s2;t1).
A decrease in s would not enable the economy to move to the G+ locus either (recall
the discussion around Figure 5.1). Thus the instrument, s, is ine⁄ective in moving the
economy from a to d. Changes in s simply move the economy along the locus G￿(s;t1).
We will now show that, by contrast, the other instrument, t, can be e⁄ective.
The method of our proof follows the following steps. Starting from the policy parame-
ters, s1;t1, at point a, we alter the policy parameters to 0;t2 and at the same time give a
public grant equal to D > G￿(0;t2). Using (2.11), this leaves G+(0;t2) as the only equilib-
rium. Once the economy is allowed to get established at this equilibrium, the stability of
beliefs argument (see subsection 5.1) can be used to argue that the economy is now on the
G+ locus. One can then choose the policy parameters optimally. In particular, one can
choose the parameters s1;t1 in which case the economy reaches the equilibrium G+(s1;t1)
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Figure 5.3: The case of decreasing subsidies from s1 to 0 with t1 ￿xed.
Figure 5.3 plots the locus of F(s1;t1;G), which is exactly as in Figure 5.2. However,
instead of sketching the graph of F(s2;t1;G), s1 < s2, as we did in Figure 5.2, we now sketch
the graph of F(0;t1;G) in Figure 5.3, which is strictly below the graph of F(s1;t1;G), if
s1 > 0, because Fs > 0. There are four equilibria a, d, e and f. Equilibria a (G￿ (s1;t1))
and d (G+ (s1;t1)), in Figure 5.3, are exactly the same as in Figure 5.2 and correspond to
the parameter values (s1;t1). However, e (G￿ (0;t1)) and f (G+ (0;t1)) correspond to the
parameter values (0;t1).
Figure 5.4 plots the locus of F(0;t1;G), which is exactly as in Figure 5.3. However,
instead of sketching the graph of F(s1;t1;G), as we did in Figure 5.3, we now sketch the
graph of F(0;t2;G), t1 < t2, in Figure 5.4, which is strictly above the graph of F(0;t1;G),
because Ft > 0. There are four equilibria e, f, g and h. Equilibria e(G￿ (0;t1)) and
f(G+ (0;t1)), in Figure 5.4, are exactly the same as in Figure 5.3 and correspond to
the parameter values (0;t1). However, g(G￿ (0;t2)) and h(G+ (0;t2)) correspond to the
parameter values (0;t2). We now consider a policy that moves the economy from a to d.
5.2.1. Moving the economy from a to d.
Suppose that the economy is at a (G￿ (s1;t1)) of Figures 5.2, 5.3. The government changes
the values of the instruments from (s1;t1) to (0;t2), where t2 =
G￿(0;t1)
M , and makes a direct
grant to the charity, D = G￿ (0;t1), ￿nanced by the income tax levied at the rate t2. If
s1 > 0 then G￿ (0;t1) > G￿ (s1;t1) (see Figure 5.3) because of the perverse comparative
statics, G￿
s < 0, on the locus G￿ (s;t1).
Since G￿ (0;t1) = D(0;t1;G￿ (0;t1)) +
Pn
i=1 g￿




M = t2, if some g￿
i > 0. Since G
￿
t < 0 (because Ft > 0, FG > 1
and G￿
t = Ft
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Figure 5.4: The case of increasing subsidies from t1 to t2 with s = 0 ￿xed.
the sole equilibrium, consistent with D, is now the high equilibrium, G+(0;t2), point h
of Figure 5.4. Once G+(0;t2) is established, each individual will make her private giving
decision conditional on G+(0;t2), thereby, raising her own giving to a higher level such
that equilibrium beliefs about G+(0;t2) become self-ful￿lling.
Invoking the stability of beliefs assumption, outlined in subsection 5.1 above, as beliefs
about G+(0;t2) become self-ful￿lling, the economy moves along the G+ locus in Figure
5.1 as one varies the policy parameters. If desired (we consider these issues in section 6
below), the government can now reduce tax rate from t2 back to its original value, t1, and
increase s back to its original value, s1. The economy then moves to point d (G+(s1;t1)),
point d of Figure 5.3.
Garrett and Rhine (2007) report that in the US, the growth in private charitable
giving over time has been paralleled by similar growth in expenditure by various levels
of government. In particular, between 1965 and 2005, the most rapid growth in private
giving (gi in our set up) has been in charities associated with health, education and social
services. These are precisely the areas in which there has been large increases in direct
government expenditure (D in our set up). The fact that the Government has responded
to an increased demand for these services by increasing the direct grant, rather than by
increasing the subsidy to private giving, is consistent with our explanation.
5.2.2. Optimal public policy at the new equilibrium
Substantial ￿eld, experimental and neuroeconomic evidence supports the assertion that
private charitable giving is a source of warm glow but direct government grants are not
(see the discussion in Remark 3). Hence, once the economy is established on the G+ locus
in Figure 5.1, it would be welfare improving to replace government grants by an equivalent
25amount of private giving, if possible. Propositions 6, 7, 8 in Section 6, below, characterize
the optimal policy when we are on the G+ locus.
6. Welfare analysis
We now ask what should be the optimal policy parameters s;t of the government when its
objective is to maximize the social welfare function (2.9). This also allows us to directly
answer the question that we posed in subsection 5.2.2 above: What should be the optimal
mix of policy parameters once the high equilibrium gets established and (using the stability
of beliefs) the economy moves along the G+ locus.
Substituting gi (s;t;G￿ (s;t)) and G￿ (s;t) (where G￿ lies either on the G￿ or the G+
locus) in the individual utility function (2.12) gives the consumer￿ s indirect utility function
v
i (s;t) = u























where, the partial derivatives G￿
s; G￿
t are given by Proposition 3(a),(b), respectively.
Substituting the indirect utility function from (6.1) into (2.9) we get the government￿ s
indirect (social) utility function































where subscripts on the utility functions, U, u denote appropriate partial derivatives.
Propositions 6, 7 and 8, below, derive the optimal mix between private and public
giving to charity in di⁄erent cases. These propositions are used extensively in Section 7
and are crucial in determining the optimal public policy at di⁄erent equilibria.
Proposition 6, below, implies that in a social optimum where G￿
t ￿ 0 no government
intervention is needed, warm glow and/or altruism su¢ ce to maximize social welfare.
Proposition 6 : Let (s￿;t￿) be a social optimum where G￿
t ￿ 0 and some g￿
i > 0, then
s￿ = t￿ = D￿ = 0. Thus all giving to charity is private giving.
26We now show, in Proposition 7, that if subsidies are e⁄ective then no direct government
grant is needed. This is because when private donations replace an identical amount of
public donations, welfare improves on account of the warm glow received by private givers.
Proposition 7 : If (s￿;t￿) is a social optimum where G￿
s ￿ 0 and some g￿
i > 0, then
D￿ = 0.
Proposition 8 : Let G￿ be a social optimum with some g￿
i > 0. Suppose (i) Fs ￿ 0 and
FG < 1 at G￿ or (ii) Fs ￿ 0 and FG > 1 at G￿. Then all charitable contributions come
from individual private donations and D￿ = 0.
The intuition behind Proposition 8 can be seen from the results in Propositions 4, 5.
In Proposition 8(i), for instance, the comparative statics are normal (and not perverse),
hence, private giving can be encouraged through the use of subsidies. Since private giving
leads to warm glow, and an improvement in welfare, it is optimal to generate all charitable
giving through private giving, rather than by direct government grants. A similar intuition
explains Proposition 8(ii).
We can now use these propositions to revisit the question that we posed in subsection
5.2.2, above. Namely, the question of the optimal policy once the economy gets established
on the G+ locus. Once established on the locus G+ comparative statics are normal, i.e.,
G+
s > 0. From Proposition 7 we know that, in this case, s attains its maximum value and
the government makes no direct contributions to charity, i.e., D = 0. All tax revenues are
then used to ￿nance subsidies to private giving. The reason is that private giving confers
warm glow on individuals and, hence, raises welfare relative to the same level of giving
being undertaken directly by the government. Hence, it is optimal to set D = 0.
7. Competitive equilibrium outcomes for Examples 1 and 2 (Sec-
tion 3)
We now apply the general theory developed so far to Examples 1 and 2 (see Section 3).
7.1. Example 1: Charitable contributions as public redistribution
Consider the setup of Example 1 (subsection 3.1) that we now take as given. Let m be















Proposition 9 summarizes the main results.
27Proposition 9 : (a) (Multiple equilibria) The only economically interesting cases occur
when [m + t(M ￿ m)]
2 > 4(1 ￿ s)A: In this case, we have two distinct, real, positive,
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, i = 1;:::;k,
g
￿
i = 0, i = k + 1;k + 2;:::;n.
(b) (Increasing and concave desire to contribute) For all G, the aggregate desire to give,
F, (i) responds positively to subsides i.e., Fs > 0 and, (ii) it is increasing and concave i.e.,
FG > 0; FGG < 0. So we have the case depicted in Figures 5.2-5.4. Furthermore,
G = G
+ ) FG < 1; G = G
￿ ) FG > 1:
(c) (Perverse and normal comparative statics) The comparative statics with respect to
the subsidy are perverse at the low equilibrium and normal at the high equilibrium, i.e.,
G￿
s < 0; G+
s > 0. For m < M (and so k < p) the same holds for the comparative static
result with respect to the tax rate, i.e., G
￿
t < 0; G
+
t > 0. For k = p, G
￿
t = 0.
The equilibria are as in Figures 5.2-5.4. Suppose that an economy is at the low equilib-
rium, G￿, and also suppose that it is socially desirable to move it to the high equilibrium,
G+. How can this be done? The situation is identical to the one presented in Section 5.2,
and so we follow the same solution method.
From Proposition 9(b), due to perverse comparative statics at the low equilibrium,
G
￿
t ￿ 0: Hence, from Proposition 6, it would appear that the best policy is no intervention
i.e., s = t = 0; leaving the economy at the low equilibrium, G￿. However, an alternative
policy is possible, as we shall now describe; see Figure 7.1.
Set the tax rate t as t = G￿(0;0)=M. Since G￿(0;0) is an equilibrium, and there is
an interior solution to consumption (from (2.4)), so 0 < G￿(0;0) < M. It follows that
0 < t < 1 and, hence, it is feasible. Set s;D as follows: s = 0 and D = tM = G￿(0;0).
Thus, the government gives a direct grant equal to G￿ (0;0) ￿nanced with an income
tax (any grant D > G￿(0;0) will also work). Since gi > 0 for some i (i = 1;2;:::;k) it
follows, from (2.11), that G > D = G￿(0;0). Hence, because we are now on the F(0;t;G)
locus (see Figure 7.1) and the equilibrium aggregate donation G > G￿(0;0) > G￿(0;t),
the only possible candidate for equilibrium is
G = G
+(0;t). (7.3)
28Figure 7.1: Multiple equilibria when Ft > 0; FG > 0; FGG < 0.
Once the economy is allowed to establish itself at the high equilibrium, G+(0;t), the
stability of beliefs (see subsection 5.1 above) ensures that the economy is on the G+ locus.
The ￿scal parameters, s,t can then be adjusted to their socially optimum values, assuming
that the economy is on the G+ locus, using the results of Section 6. We now address this
issue.
7.1.1. Socially optimal public policy at the new equilibrium
At the low equilibrium, G￿(0;0), private individuals cannot be induced to make additional
contributions because of the perverse comparative statics, G￿
s (0;0) < 0, G
￿
t (0;0) < 0. In
contrast, the comparative statics at the high equilibrium, G+(s;t), for any values of s;t
are normal. Suppose that we allow the economy to establish itself at the G+ locus. We
now illustrate the insights of subsection 5.2 for the concrete case of Example 1 (subsection
3.1). Consider two cases.
1. If k < p, so that not all consumers with positive income are caring and so do not
contribute to charity, then, m < M. From Proposition 9(c), G+
s > 0, G
+
t > 0, i.e.,
the comparative static e⁄ects are normal at the high equilibrium. Depending on
the parameter values, the optimal tax rate may be positive, in which case it can be
found by setting Vt = 0 in (6.6). From Proposition 9(b), at the high equilibrium
G+, Fs > 0, and FG < 1, so, Proposition 8 implies that D = 0. Thus, once the
economy has moved from the G￿ locus to the G+ locus, the direct grant from the
government to the charity is phased out. In the new, socially optimal, equilibrium, all
contributions to charity are exclusively private (because only private contributions
are associated with warm glow) and all income tax revenue is used to subsidize
private donations to charity.
292. If k = p, so that all consumers with positive income contribute to charity, then
m = M. Hence, from Proposition 9(c), G
+
t = 0. It follows, from Proposition 6, that
once the economy has established itself on the G+ locus, s = t = 0. Thus, once the
(one-o⁄) direct government grant to charity (￿nanced by an income tax) has shifted
the economy from the bad equilibrium, G￿, to the good equilibrium, G+, no further
government intervention is needed and the entire charitable contributions come from




7.1.2. A numerical illustration of Example 1
We now illustrate the above results by a numerical simulation of Example 1. Speci￿cally,
let n = 1900, p = 900, k = 450, ai = 0:01, i = 1;2;:::;450, ai = 0, i = 451;:::;1900, mi = 1
(so that g
￿
i can be interpreted as fraction of income given to charity), i = 1;2;:::;900,
mi = 0, i = 901;:::;1900, ￿i = 0, i = 1;2;:::;900,
P1900
i=901 ￿i = G. Thus,
m =
X450










Initially, assume that s = t = 0. Then, from (7.4) and Proposition 9(a), G￿(0;0) = 150,






3, i = 1;:::;450, g
￿
i = 0, i =
451;:::;1900.
Suppose that the locus passing through G￿ is considered to be socially inferior to
that passing through G+. How can government policy shift the economy onto the better




t < 0, the best policy would appear to be no intervention: s = t = 0. However, there
is an alternative. The government sets s = 0; t = 1=6. This raises a total tax revenue
equal to tM = 900=6 = 150: Since G
￿
t < 0, it follows that G￿(0;1=6) < 150 at t = 1=6.
The government makes a direct grant D = G￿(0;0) = 150 to the charity. Since gi > 0;
i = 1;2;:::;450, we must have G(0;1=6) = D+
X450
i=1 gi(0;1=6;G) > D = 150 = G￿(0;0) >
G￿(0;1=6). Hence, the only possible equilibrium is G = G+(0;1=6). Once the economy is
on the G+ locus and the new equilibrium gets established (see subsection 5.1 above) s;t
can be given their optimal values as shown in Propositions 6, 7, 8 in Section 6.
7.2. Example 2: Voluntary contributions to a public good
We now consider Example 2 (subsection 3.2). In this example, G has the interpretation
of public infrastructure such as health and education. De￿ne the constants B;C as:
B =
Xn
i=1 aimi + t
Xn
i=1 (1 ￿ ai)mi, C =
Xn
i=1 aibi. (7.5)
The main results for this example are listed in Proposition 10, below.
30Proposition 10 : (a) (Multiple equilibria) The only economically interesting cases occur
when B2 > 4C. In this case, we have two distinct real positive equilibria 0 < G￿ (s;t) <























, i = 1;2;:::n.
(b) (Increasing and concave desire to contribute) The aggregate desire to give, F, (i)
responds positively to taxes, i.e., Ft > 0, (ii) is unresponsive to subsidies, i.e., Fs = 0,
and, (iii) it is increasing and concave, i.e., FG > 0; FGG < 0 (as in Figures 5.2-5.4).
Furthermore,
G = G
+ ) FG < 1; G = G
￿ ) FG > 1:
(c) (Neutral comparative statics) Comparative statics are neutral, i.e., G￿
s = 0. Thus,
subsidies are ine⁄ective in in￿ uencing aggregate giving. Furthermore, G
￿
t < 0, G
+
t > 0.
From Proposition 10, we know that the economy has two equilibria, as in Figure 7.1.
1. The low equilibrium is characterized by low voluntary contributions to the public
good, causing low aggregate spending on the public good infrastructure, G￿. From
(3.4), to achieve any speci￿c utility level, high private consumption expenditure
is needed. From the budget constraint, (2.7), we see that, as a consequence, less
income can be contributed to the public good, which is a strategic complement,
thus, perpetuating the low expenditure on infrastructure.
2. The high equilibrium is characterized by high contributions to the public good, caus-
ing high aggregate expenditure on infrastructure, G+. In turn, this implies that rel-
atively less private consumption expenditure is needed to reach any speci￿c utility
level. Hence, relatively more income is left over to donate to charity, perpetuating
high expenditure on infrastructure.
Suppose that the economy is at the low equilibrium, G￿, and that it is socially desirable
to move the economy to the high equilibrium, G+. How can this transition be achieved?
From Proposition 10(c), we know that incentives in the form of a subsidy will not work
because G￿
s = 0. From Proposition 10(c), G
￿
t < 0, so, from Proposition 6, it would appear
that, at the low equilibrium G￿, the best feasible policy is no intervention: s = t = 0,
31leaving the economy at the low equilibrium G￿. However, an alternative policy is possible,





Since G￿ (0;0) is an equilibrium, 0 < G￿ (0;0) < M. Hence, it follows, from Proposi-
tion 2(a), that 0 < t < 1, which is a feasible tax rate. Set s = 0 and D = tM = G￿ (0;0),
i.e., the government gives a direct grant to public good provision equal to G￿ (0;0) that is
￿nanced from an income tax. Since gi > 0 it follows, from (2.11), that G > D = G￿ (0;0).
Since we are now on the F(0;t;G) locus (see Figure 7.1) and the equilibrium aggregate
donation G > G￿ (0;0) > G￿ (0;t), the only possible equilibrium is G = G+ (0;t). Once
the high equilibrium is established, the stability of beliefs ensures that the economy is on
the G+ locus. The ￿scal parameters s, t can then be adjusted to their socially optimal
values as suggested in Section 6. We now turn to this issue.
7.2.1. Socially optimal public policy at the new equilibrium
From Proposition 10(b) the relevant graph is as in Figure 7.1. Once the economy has
moved to the new equilibrium, G+, the direct grant from the government, D = G￿ (0;0),
towards the public good can be phased out. It is welfare improving to do so because of
the normal comparative statics at the high equilibrium, and the fact that private giving
confers warm glow, while an equivalent amount of direct grants does not.
In the low equilibrium, G￿, we have seen above that the optimal policy solution is
s = t = 0. However, from Proposition 10(c), we know that at the high equilibrium,
G
+
t > 0, and so, the comparative static results are reversed from the low equilibrium. The
optimal tax rate, which can be found from (6.6), balances the loss in private consumption
against the gain arising from the additional amount of the public good. Also, from (6.5),
Vs > 0, hence, it is welfare improving to provide additional subsidies. Thus, all tax
revenues are used to ￿nance subsidies on charitable donations. In the socially optimal
solution at the high equilibrium, G+, therefore, s > 0; t > 0 while D = 0 (see Proposition
7).
7.2.2. A numerical illustration of Example 2
As a numerical illustration of Example 2, consider an economy of n = 50 identical con-
sumers, each with income mi = 1 (so that g
￿
i can be interpreted as fraction of income given
to charity). Choose ai = 0:1 and bi = 0:8 (the relevant utility function in given in (3.4)).
Suppose that initially, s = t = 0. Then (7.5), (7.6) give G￿(0;0) = 1 and G+(0;0) = 4,





i = 0:08, i = 1;2;:::;50.
32Suppose that the economy is, initially, at the low equilibrium G￿(0;0) = 1. If the move









and the feasibility condition (3.5) still holds at this tax rate. The government uses its
entire tax revenue tM = 1 = G￿(0;0) to make a contribution D = G￿(0;0) = 1 to the
public good. Since g￿
i > 0; G￿(0;0:02) = D +
Xn
i=1 g￿
i > 1 = G￿(0;0). In terms of Figure
7.1, the economy is on the F(0;0:02;G) locus. Hence, the only candidate for equilibrium
is G = G+(0;0:02). Once the economy is on the high equilibrium, G+(0;0:02), the policy
parameters s;t can be adjusted to their socially optimal values. This will involve the
phasing out of the direct grant. Once the ￿nal position of the, new, socially optimal,
equilibrium is established, the government uses all tax revenues to subsidize voluntary
contributions to the public good. The direct grant, here, is only a temporary measure to
shift the economy from the low equilibrium locus G￿ to the high equilibrium locus G+.
8. Dynamics
In this paper we have concentrated exclusively on equilibrium analysis. For certain pur-
poses, a rigorous analysis of the time path of adjustment may be required. This, however,
will involve specifying a precise list of the information sets of each of the players, the up-
dating rules, and a learning process32. This, however, lies beyond the scope of the current
paper.
The reader of this paper might have wondered about the stability properties of the
equilibria. To study the stability of equilibria, an adjustment process needs to be speci￿ed.
A popular adjustment process in economics is the partial adjustment scheme. Let G￿
be an equilibrium, G(x) the value of G at time, x, and ￿ a positive constant. Then the
partial adjustment scheme is given by
￿
G(x) = ￿[G
￿ ￿ G(x)], (8.1)
from which we can see that G￿ is a stable equilibrium. Although a plausibility argument
can be given for (8.1), it cannot be derived from the behavior of the decision makers in
our model. The reason is that there are no dynamic constraints in our model. So if all
32At the moment there is a lack of consenus in the profession about the appropriate model of learn-
ing and there is ￿ too large￿a variety of models to choose from. These include reinforcement learning,
learning through ￿ctitious play, learning direction theory, Bayesian learning, imitation learning, experi-
ence weighted attraction learning, etc. For a survey of the experimental evidence on these theories, see
Camerer (2003)
33agents believe that the resulting equilibrium will be G￿, then they will jump straight to
G￿. It is not clear why they should follow (8.1).
Another popular adjustment process is
￿
G(x) = ￿[F (s;t;G(x)) ￿ G(x)]. (8.2)
For ￿ > 0, (8.2) says that aggregate giving moves in the direction of the aggregate desire
to give; which appears plausible. It is similar to the tatonnement process in general
competitive equilibrium and the Cournot adjustment process in oligopoly theory. Both
have been extensively studied in the past but are no more regarded as true dynamic
processes.
For the moment, let us take (8.2) seriously. Suppose ￿ > 0. If FG < 1 at an equilibrium,
G￿, then G￿ is stable. This is compatible with either normal comparative statics (if Fs > 0)
or perverse comparative statics (if Fs < 0). If FG > 1, then G￿ is unstable; and this is also
compatible with normal comparative statics (if Fs < 0) or perverse comparative statics
(if Fs > 0). The exact reverse happens if ￿ < 0. Therefore, we cannot assume that an
equilibrium with perverse comparative statics is unstable and, therefore, uninteresting.
Moreover, it can be argued that the correct stability notion is saddle path stability.
This requires that the number of stable eigenvalues of a dynamic system (calculated at
equilibrium) be equal to the number of predetermined variables and the number of un-
stable eigenvalues be equal to the number of jump variables. Our system (8.2) is one
dimensional (though non-linear). We have no predetermined variables (our model lacks
dynamic constraints). The one variable, G, of (8.2) is a jump variable (our model allows
agents to choose any gi and, hence, any G). Thus saddle path stability (which is arguably
the correct notion of stability here) actually requires that (8.2) be unstable (as in simple
macro models of exchange rate determination).
To summarize, the only natural dynamics for our model is the very simple one where
agents jump to whatever equilibrium is in line with their expectations.
9. Strategic giving33
So far we have considered only competitive equilibria in giving in the sense that each
giver, i, takes aggregate giving, G, as given. By contrast, in a static Nash noncooperative
equilibrium each giver, i, takes as given the contributions of all others, G￿i = G￿gi. If gi is
small relative to G, one would expect that it would not make much di⁄erence whether giver
i took G￿i as given or G as given. In subsection 9.1 we will show that this is indeed the
case in the sense that, as the number of individuals increases, a Nash equilibrium in giving
33We are grateful for the comments of a referee in rewriting this section.
34converges to a competitive equilibrium. Subsection 9.2 (9.3) shows that, for Example 1
(respectively 2), a Nash equilibrium outcome is within 1% of a competitive equilibrium if
the number of givers is 200 (respectively 1600) or more.
9.1. Convergence of a Nash equilibrium in giving to a competitive equilibrium
We have to distinguish between the case where G increases due to an increase in gi,
i = 1;2;:::;n, for ￿xed n and the case where G increases because of an increase in n.
Thus, we rewrite the utility (2.2) of giver i as
u








In (9.1), we see that an increase in G, for ￿xed n, increases ui (if ui
3 > 0) as before.
However, an N fold replication of the economy will result in an increase in the number of
givers from n to Nn and also an increase in total giving from G to NG. From (9.1) we
see that this leaves wi (and, hence, also ui) unchanged, which is what we want.34
Substituting from the individual budget constraint (2.7) into (9.1) gives
U
i (gi;G;s;t) = w
i
￿





which is equivalent to (2.12). Di⁄erentiating (9.2) w.r.t. gi taking G as given, yields
@Ui
@gi




2 (G given: Competitive case). (9.3)
Now substitute gi + G￿i for G in (9.2) to get
U
i (gi;gi + G￿i;s;t) = w
i
￿





Di⁄erentiating (9.4) w.r.t. gi taking G￿i as given, yields
@Ui
@gi









3 (G￿i given: Nash case). (9.5)
Since wi
3 is a continuous function on the compact set [0;Fmax] (Recall De￿nition 2), it
follows that wi
3 is bounded. Hence, as n ! 1, (9.3) goes over to (9.5). Hence, as n ! 1,
the set of Nash equilibria determined by the ￿rst order conditions derived from (9.5) goes
over to the set of competitive equilibria determined by the ￿rst order conditions derived
from (9.3). Hence, we have established the following proposition.
Proposition 11 : A Nash equilibrium in giving converges to a competitive equilibrium
in giving as the number of givers, n, goes to in￿nity.
34For Example 1 we have ui = lnci + aigiG = lnci + ￿igi
G
n, where ￿i = na. We hold ￿i ￿xed as we
take the limit n ! 1.











+ ai lngi, where
￿i = bi
n . We hold ￿i ￿xed as we take the limit n ! 1.
359.2. Nash equilibria for Example 1 (public redistribution)
Proposition 12 : (a) For the numerical values given in subsection 7.1.2, above, there
are two Nash equilibria. The following table compares the competitive outcomes (third
column) with the Nash outcomes (fourth column) at the two equilibria.
Competitive Nash
Aggregate giving G￿ 150 149:33
Aggregate giving G+ 300 300:66
Individual giving g
￿








i = 0, i = 451;:::;1900 0 0
(b) For k givers,
1=3￿g￿
i




2=3 < r , k > 1￿r￿2r2
r+2r2 . In particular, if
k > 197, then the individual (and aggregate) Nash giving is within 1% of the competitive
value.
In Proposition 12(a) the competitive and Nash solutions are determined for the nu-
merical values of the parameters in subsection 7.1.2. Replication of the economy does not
a⁄ect the competitive equilibrium values that were derived in subsection 7.1.2 but it a⁄ects
the Nash equilibrium values g
￿
i . In part Proposition 12(b) we compare the percentage dif-
ference between the competitive outcome and g
￿
i for any arbitrary r > 0. The inequality
k > 197 corresponds to the value r = 0:01.
9.3. Nash equilibria for Example 2 (public goods)
Proposition 13 : (a) For the numerical values given in subsection 7.2.2, above, there are
two Nash equilibria. Table-I compares the competitive outcomes (third column) with the
Nash outcomes (fourth column) at the two equilibria.
TABLE-I: Competitive and Nash equilibria for 50 givers
Competitive Nash
Aggregate giving G￿ 1 0:7766
Aggregate giving G+ 4 4:2234
Individual giving g
￿
i , i = 1;2;:::;50 0:0200 0:0155
Individual giving g
+
i , i = 1;2;:::;50 0:0800 0:0845
(b) For n givers,
0:02￿g￿
i




0:08 < r , n > 9
3r+16r2. In particular, if
n > 1592, then the individual (and aggregate) Nash giving is within 1% of the competitive
value.
(c) For the same parameter values, Table-II reports the Nash levels of individual giving,
g
￿
i , as the number of individual givers, n, increases from 100 to 10;000.
TABLE-II: Convergence of Nash giving as the number of givers increases
36n 100 500 1000 10;000
g
￿
i 0:0177 0:0195 0:0198 0:0200
g
+
i 0:0823 0:0805 0:0802 0:0800
10. Conclusions
Private philanthropic activity is much studied in economics and is of immense economic
importance. The empirical evidence suggests that the vast bulk of giving activity is un-
dertaken by very large numbers of diverse, dispersed and small givers. For such givers, the
competitive equilibrium model in economics would seem to be a natural ￿t. However, the
existing literature has typically (but not always) described the activity of ￿ giving￿within
the ambit of a symmetric Nash equilibrium in strategic giving. Furthermore, the literature
has, by and large, restricted itself to a unique equilibrium in giving. We relax both these
features of the existing literature. Our framework is not restricted to the economics of
charity. As our examples show, our results also have an equally important bearing on
many public goods contexts, particularly those that involve private provision of public
goods.35
Coordination problems and multiple equilibria are the norm in many situations of
economic interest, but they are often ruled out by assumption. It is not surprising that
uncoordinated private giving might lead to the possibility of multiple equilibria. We show
that a necessary condition for multiple equilibria is our proposed condition of aggregate
strategic complementarity between own-giving and aggregate-giving to a charity. Strategic
complementarity at the level of each giver is su¢ cient but not necessary for aggregate
strategic complementarity.
Once one allows for multiple equilibria that can potentially be ranked according to
some social criteria, the following question arises naturally. If society is stuck at a low
equilibrium, characterized by low levels of giving, can public policy help it to attain a high
equilibrium? This is not a trivial question because our understanding of engineering moves
between alternative equilibria in economics is not very well developed. In the context of
private philanthropic activity (and public good contexts), we show that temporary direct
government grants to charities allow for such engineering of moves between equilibria.36
The signi￿cance of this result, to our mind, goes beyond a charity or a public goods context.
We also perform a welfare analysis and examine the optimality of alternative mixes
of private and public contributions to charity. We show, for some parameter values, that
additional incentives to giving can reduce the aggregate of private contributions in equilib-
35One can also consider applications of this framework to the provision of public goods in a federation.
36This result, in our model, also has the potential to explain the e¢ cacy of seed money, leadership
contributions, and direct grants by large donors, e.g., the National Lottery (as in the UK).
37rium (perverse comparative statics). In such cases, it might be best to ￿nance charitable
giving, if required, by direct government grants ￿nanced through taxation. For other pa-
rameter values, however, giving to charity responds well to incentives (normal comparative
statics). In this case, charitable giving should be entirely funded by private individual
contributions, possibly subsidized through taxation. This is welfare improving because
private giving leads to warm glow, while direct government grants do not.
The aggregate desire to give function played a key role in this paper. It may also be
useful in other contexts.
Throughout we focus on equilibrium analysis. The dynamics of time paths from one
equilibrium to another involve fundamental questions about the precise learning mecha-
nisms to be used. Although progress on learning mechanisms is being made and in due
course such mechanisms may enrich our model, currently such issues lie beyond the scope
of this paper.
11. Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: (a) Ui is a continuous, strictly concave function (see (2.13)) de￿ned
on a compact interval (see (2.14)). Hence, a maximum exists and it is unique. (b) Denoting




1￿s [(1 ￿ t)mi + ￿i ￿ ci]. (c) If, in addition, (2.6) holds, then g￿
i > 0. ￿
Proof of Lemma 1: If g￿
i > 0, then, in the light of Proposition 1b, g￿
i is an interior
maximum and part (a) follows. Part (b) follows from (2.12). Appealing to the implicit
function theorem, or di⁄erentiating the identity, (1 ￿ s)ui
1 = ui
2, establishes parts (c), (d)
and (e). ￿
Proof of Lemma 2: Follows from (2.12) and De￿nition 1. ￿
Proof of Lemma 3: (a) First, suppose that g￿
i > 0. The result then follows from Lemma




@G ￿ 0 (￿ 0) holds for all g￿
i ￿ 0. Then, a fortiori, it holds for all
g￿
i > 0. Hence, by (a), gi and G are strategic complements (substitutes). (bii) Since ui is
C2, g￿
i is C1, i.e.,
@g￿
i
@G is continuous. Now, suppose that gi and G are strategic complements
(substitutes). Then, by (a),
@g￿
i
@G ￿ 0 (￿ 0) holds for all g￿







@G ￿ 0 (￿ 0) holds for g￿
i ￿ 0. ￿
Proof of Lemma 4: Follows from (4.7) and Lemma 3. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2: In the text. ￿



























38Proof of Proposition 3: Let G￿ be an equilibrium at which FG 6= 1. Then, from
Proposition 2c, G￿ is isolated. By De￿nition 5, G￿ = F (s;t;G￿). Di⁄erentiating this
implicitly, and rearranging, gives the required results. ￿
Proof of Corollary 1: Immediate from Proposition 3 and De￿nition 7. ￿
Proof of Propositions 4 and 5: Obvious from Proposition 3(a), (b), respectively, and
Lemma 4. ￿
Proof of Lemma 6: From the government budget constraint, (4.2), evaluated at equilib-
rium, we get D(s;t;G￿ (s;t)) = tM ￿s
Xn
i=1 g￿
i (s;t;G￿ (s;t)). Rewrite this with D and t






































Proof of Proposition 6: Let (s￿;t￿) maximize social welfare (6.4). By assumption,
ui
1 > 0, ui
3 ￿ 0, Ui > 0 and mi ￿ 0 with some mi > 0. If G￿
t ￿ 0 then, from (6.6), it
follows that Vt < 0. Hence, necessarily, t￿ = 0. Since D￿ ￿ 0, s￿ ￿ 0 and some g￿
i > 0 it
follows from the government budget constraint (2.8) that s￿ = D￿ = 0. ￿
Proof of Proposition 7: Let (s￿;t￿) maximize social welfare (6.4). By assumption,
ui
1 > 0, ui
3 ￿ 0, Ui > 0 and g￿
i ￿ 0 with some g￿
i > 0. Hence, if G￿
s ￿ 0 then
(6.5) implies that Vs > 0. Viewing D and t as the independent government instru-
ments we get,
@V (s(D;t);t)
@D = Vs (s(D;t);t)
@s(D;t)
















. Since Vs > 0, G￿
s ￿ 0, g￿
i ￿ 0 with some g￿
i > 0,
it follows that @V
@D < 0. Suppose D￿ > 0. Since @V
@D < 0, it follows that V can be increased
further by reducing D, which contradicts the assumption that (s￿;t￿) maximizes social
welfare. Hence, D￿ = 0. ￿
Proof of Proposition 8: From Proposition 3(a), G￿
s (s;t) = Fs
1￿FG. So when Fs ￿ 0 and
FG < 1 at G￿, or if Fs ￿ 0 and FG > 1 at G￿, we get G￿
s (s;t) > 0. Proposition 7 then
implies that s attains its maximum value and direct government grants are zero. ￿















, i = 1;:::;k. (11.2)
From (3.2) and (11.1) we see that g￿
i (s;t;G) > 0 and from (11.2) c￿
i (s;t;G) > 0. On the
other hand, from (3.3) we get that
g
￿
i = 0, i = k + 1;k + 2;:::;n. (11.3)
From (4.3), (7.1) - (7.2), (11.1), the aggregate desire to give to charity is




39) Ft = M ￿ m ￿ 0. (11.5)
The inequality in (11.5) is strict for m < M, i.e., k < p. Direct di⁄erentiation of (11.4)




> 0, FG = (1 ￿ s)
A
G2 > 0, FGG = ￿2(1 ￿ s)
A
G3 < 0. (11.6)
From De￿nition 5 and (11.4), an equilibrium G, must satisfy the quadratic equation
G
2 ￿ [m + t(M ￿ m)]G + (1 ￿ s)A = 0. (11.7)






m + t(M ￿ m) ￿
q
[m + t(M ￿ m)]
2 ￿ 4(1 ￿ s)A
￿
. (11.8)
For real roots we need [m + t(M ￿ m)]
2 ￿ 4(1 ￿ s)A. If [m + t(M ￿ m)]
2 = 4(1 ￿ s)A
then, from (11.6), FG = 1. From Proposition 3(a), (b) it would follow that G￿
s, G￿
t are
unde￿ned. Hence, the only economically interesting cases occur when,
[m + t(M ￿ m)]
2 > 4(1 ￿ s)A, (11.9)
in which case we have two distinct real positive equilibria
0 < G
















, i = 1;:::;k, (11.11)
g
￿
i = 0, i = k + 1;k + 2;:::;n. (11.12)
Using the fact that for real numbers a;b, a > b:
p




b, as well as (11.6)
and (11.8) - (11.10), we get
G = G
+ ) FG < 1, G = G
￿ ) FG > 1. (11.13)
From Proposition 3(a), (b), (11.5), (11.6), (11.13) we get
G
+
s > 0, G
￿
s < 0, (11.14)
G
+
t > 0, G
￿
t < 0 (for m < M, i.e., k < p), (11.15)
G
￿
t = 0 (for m = M, i.e., k = p). (11.16)
40Proof of Proposition 10: Applying Lemma 1(b) to the utility function (3.4), and using














i(s;t;G) = (1 ￿ ai)
￿








From (3.5) and (11.17), (11.18), we see that g￿




thermore, it is straightforward to verify that the second order conditions also hold. Hence,
given s;t;G; g￿
i(s;t;G), c￿
i(s;t;G) maximize utility (3.4) subject to the budget constraint
(2.7), and are unique.
Substituting from (11.17) into (4.3) the aggregate desire to give, F(s;t;G) is:
F(s;t;G) =
Xn
i=1 aimi + t
Xn





From (11.19) we get:
Fs = 0, Ft =
Xn








i=1 aibi < 0.
(11.20)







From (11.20) and Proposition 8, it follows that, at a social optimum, D = 0, i.e., no direct
grant from the government to the charity is involved. Giving to charity is entirely funded
by private donations, which are subsidized from taxation if s > 0, t > 0.
To make further progress, we need to determine the equilibrium values of G. From (4.3),
(11.19) and De￿nition 5, the equilibrium values of G are the solutions to the equation
G =
Xn
i=1 aimi + t
Xn





Substituting (7.5) in (11.22) we get
G












If B2 < 4C, then no equilibrium exists. If B2 = 4C then a unique equilibrium exists, and
is G = B
2 =
p
C: But then, from (11.20), (7.5), FG = 1. In this case, neither G￿
s nor G￿
t
are de￿ned, see Proposition 3(a), (b). Hence, the only interesting case is when B2 > 4C.
41In this case, (11.23) has two distinct real positive roots:
0 < G














, i = 1;2;:::n. (11.26)
Using the fact that for real numbers a > b > 0:
p




b, as well as (11.20),
(7.5) and (11.24) - (11.25), we get
G = G
+ ) FG < 1, G = G
￿ ) FG > 1. (11.27)
From (11.20), (11.27) and Proposition 3(b), we get G
+
t > 0, G
￿
t < 0. ￿
Proof of Proposition 12: Rewrite (3.1) as
u





, i = 1;2;:::;k, (11.28)
where ￿i = kai. For the reasons explained in subsection 9.1, above, we shall take the
limit, k ! 1, keeping ￿i ￿xed. We use the same parameter values as in subsection 7.1.2.
Thus ai = 0:01, ￿i = 450ai = 4:5, mi = 1 (so that g
￿
i can be interpreted as the fraction
of income given to charity), ￿i = 0, s = t = 0. Hence, the giver￿ s budget constraint is
ci = 1 ￿ gi. Substituting these, along with G = gi + G￿i, into (11.28) gives
u





, i = 1;2;:::;k. (11.29)









, i = 1;2;:::;k, (11.30)
from which we see that gi = gj, i;j = 1;2;:::;k. Substituting G = kgi in (11.30) gives
9(1 + k)g2













, i = 1;2;:::;k. (11.31)













< r , k > 1￿r￿2r2
r+2r2 .
From these, and (11.31), the required results follow. ￿
Proof of Proposition 13: Rewrite (3.4) as
u






+ ai lngi, (11.32)
42where ￿i = bi=n. For the reasons explained in subsection 9.1, above, we shall take the
limit, n ! 1, keeping ￿i ￿xed. We use the same parameter values as in subsection 7.2.2.
Thus ai = 0:1, ￿i = 0:8=50 = 0:016, mi = 1 (so that g
￿
i can be interpreted as the fraction
of income given to charity), ￿i = 0, s = t = 0. Hence, the giver￿ s budget constraint is
ci = 1 ￿ gi. Substituting these, along with G = gi + G￿i, into (11.32) gives
u
i (1 ￿ gi;gi;gi + G￿i) = 0:9ln
￿










From (11.34) we see that all gi are equal. Substituting G = ngi in (11.34) gives g2
i ￿0:1gi+
0:0016 ￿ 0:0144n￿1 = 0. Solving gives
g
￿
i = 0:05 ￿ 0:03
p
1 + 16n￿1, (11.35)
which leads to the ￿gures in Tables I and II.
Also from (11.35) it follows that
0:02￿g￿
i




0:08 < r , n >
9
3r+16r2. From these, the required results follow. ￿
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